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The purpose of this paper is to examine narrow banking proposals.
First, we survey the narrow banking proposals presented in the
United States and Japan, and categorize them by means of two 
standards: (1) whether safe assets that a narrow bank is allowed to
hold are limited to short-term assets, and (2) whether a narrow
bank is allowed to engage in lending activity. Second, we examine
the feasibility of each proposal for the purpose of achieving the 
stability of the financial system, making use of two theoretical 
models: Wallace (1996) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (1998).
Finally, we conclude that a desirable narrow bank is one that carries
out both deposit-taking and lending activities, though restrictively,
and is allowed to invest in short-term safe assets.
Key  words:  Narrow bank; Bank run; Integrated operation of
deposit-taking and lending services; LiquidityI. Introduction
The recent trend in bank regulation concerns how to prevent contagion in the 
financial system. Bank regulation thus far has been mainly dependent on the safety
net, such as deposit insurance. The crucial feature of the safety net relies on an 
ex post discretionary intervention of the state. Recently it has been pointed out that,
while the stability of the financial system depends on the safety net, it has also 
generated a social cost due to moral hazard behavior of the financial institutions.
Thus, an ex ante regulatory method based on market discipline is now being sought
to replace the ex post discretionary regulation, and narrow banking proposals are
attracting much attention as such a regulatory mechanism.
1
Proposals suggest that two major functions of banks (i.e., deposit-taking and 
lending activities) should be undertaken by different institutions in order to prevent
contagion of financial risk from the payment system. In this case, narrow banks are
broadly referred to as ones specializing in deposit-taking/payment activities that do
not provide lending services. But a precise definition of narrow banks varies greatly
among the proposals. For example, one proposal limits a narrow bank to investing 
in short-term safe assets such as Treasury bills (TBs) (e.g., the proposal of Pierce
[1991]), while another allows the bank to lend money to small firms (e.g., the 
proposal of Bryan [1991]); yet they both define the banking structure as “narrow
banks.” This ambiguity in the definition of the narrow bank leads us to question 
how robust each proposal would be against financial risk and which proposal is 
most feasible for achieving the stability of the financial system. Nonetheless, such 
differences in proposals have not been analyzed extensively.
2
This paper first describes several narrow banking proposals presented in the
United States and Japan, and categorizes them by means of two standards: 
(1) whether safe assets that a narrow bank is allowed to hold should be limited to
short-term assets, and (2) whether a narrow bank is allowed to engage in lending
activity along with deposit-taking (and settlement) activity. Second, we examine how
feasible each proposal is for achieving the stability of the financial system, making 
use of two theoretical models: Wallace (1996) and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 
(1998; KRS hereafter). We rely on Wallace (1996) to examine the first standard of
the classification of the proposals, and KRS (1998) to examine the second standard
of the classification. Let us go through their arguments briefly.
First, Wallace (1996) claims that, if the narrow bank is allowed to invest only in
the short-term safe assets, the financial system may achieve the Pareto optimum. On
the other hand, if the bank holds long-term safe assets as well as short-term assets, the
system cannot achieve the Pareto optimum because the narrow bank may fall into a 
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1. Recently, Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd., a major retailer, and Sony Corp. announced their intention to enter banking 
business. Ito-Yokado plans to offer deposit-taking and settlement services, but will not provide lending services.
This attracts a great deal of attention, since it can be regarded as a realization of narrow banking proposals.
2. As we see in the next section, some of the proposals suggest the compatibility of the safety net. But the proposals
have generated much discussion in connection with the purpose of achieving the stability of the financial system
without ex post discretionary intervention of the government, such as the safety net. To be sure, the safety net and
narrow banking proposals are not necessarily opposed to each other, but they should be distinguished explicitly
during a theoretical study. Thus, this paper focuses on narrow banking, excluding the safety net.liquidity shortage due to a costly liquidation of the long-term assets; in some cases
(e.g., when all depositors wish to withdraw funds) the bank cannot fulfill all the 
liquidity needs of the depositors.
Second, KRS (1998) study the banks’ provision of a commitment line to their
client firms, and claim that there may exist significant economic synergy between
deposit-taking and lending activities as long as deposit withdrawals and commitment
takedowns are not too highly correlated. In other words, banks providing both
deposit-taking and lending can share some of the costly overhead incurred by holding
a large volume of liquid assets such as cash and securities. They conclude both 
theoretically and empirically that it is efficient if one financial institution carries 
out both functions, rather than two separate institutions specializing in either of 
the two activities.
Summing up these results derived by two models, we conclude that a desirable
structure of the narrow bank is one that carries out both deposit-taking and lending
activities, while its investment is limited to short-term safe assets which include 
mortgage loans and loans made under the commitment line.
Let us point out in advance several limitations of our analysis. First, we focus only
on the liquidity risk, while not treating the credit risk at all. A bank run in Wallace
(1996) is only due to unexpected deposit withdrawals, not to poorly performing
bank loans. Second, the payment mechanism is not examined rigorously in the
model. Depositors’ motivation to hold deposits is to achieve their optimal consump-
tion under future uncertainty, not to settle their “due to” positions. Owing to these
limitations, it is not appropriate to derive policy implications for such questions as
whether Japan’s postal savings system would continue to exist as a narrow bank,
3 or
whether central banks and narrow banks would be competitive.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter II explains the narrow banking 
proposals presented in the United States and Japan, and classifies them by means 
of the two standards mentioned above. Chapters III and IV examine the theoretical 
feasibility of each proposal for achieving the stability of the financial system, making
use of two theoretical models: Wallace (1996) and KRS (1998). Chapter V concludes
the paper.
II. Practical Survey of the Narrow Banking Proposals
Narrow banks are often cited as banks that specialize in deposit-taking/payment
activities and are prohibited from lending activity. Although the underlying notion of
narrow banks varies greatly among different proposals, such difference has been paid
little attention by academics. In this section, we first survey several narrow banking
proposals and clarify the concept of narrow banks.
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3. In Japan, plans call for the postal savings system to become a public corporation by 2003. As a first step of this
reform, the system’s duty of deposit in the Ministry of Finance will be abolished in 2001. This reform means 
that the postal savings system will approximate a narrow banking system. Assessing the future of the postal savings
in the Japanese financial system, it is important to examine whether the postal savings system as an approximation
of the narrow banking system could exist under a competitive financial market.A. History of the Narrow Banking Proposals
Historically, the origin of narrow banking proposals can be traced back to the
Chicago Plan, first advocated in the United States in 1933. This plan includes 
the idea of “100 percent money,” which removes the credit creation mechanism of
private banks for the purpose of preventing bank runs and reducing the volatility 
of economic fluctuations. The plan, however, was rejected by the U.S. Congress and
in 1935 the Bank Act adopted an improvement of deposit insurance and a restriction
on deposit rates. Ironically, economists such as Fisher (1935) and Friedman (1960)
were active supporters of “100 percent money.” But the idea mainly focused on a
removal of credit creation, a reduction of volatility of economic fluctuations, and an
improvement of the controllability of the money supply, and less attention was paid
to the stability of the financial system.
From the 1980s, financial liberalization and securitization got under way and
financial crises, such as the savings and loan debacle, occurred. This naturally
attracted more attention to the stability of regulatory methods based on market 
discipline than to current discretionary regulation. Through the course of discussion,
some narrow banking proposals were considered.
B. Conceptual Classifications of the Narrow Banking Proposals
This section gives an overview of major narrow banking proposals. In the following,
we survey three proposals: those of Litan (1987), Pierce (1991), and Bryan (1991).
Let us describe them in order.
(1) The proposal of Litan (1987): The first narrow banking proposal on record
was set forth by Professor Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution (Litan
[1987]). The proposal authorizes “financial holding companies” as highly
diversified financial conglomerates. The companies have two kinds of sub-
sidiaries: “banks” and separately incorporated lending subsidiaries. The banks
serve as transaction processors, accepting deposits and investing only in highly
liquid safe securities, or in practice, obligations of the U.S. Treasury or other
federally guaranteed instruments. On the other hand, the financial holding
companies extend lending services only through the lending subsidiaries,
wholly funded by commercial paper, debentures, equity, and so on.
4
(2) The proposal of Pierce (1991): This proposal was designed by Professor James
Pierce of the University of California, Berkeley (Pierce [1991]). It separates
monetary and financial functions into individual institutions; while monetary
service companies serve monetary functions, financial functions are handled
by financial service companies. The former provide checking accounts and
wire transfers and are permitted to pay interest in all their accounts, but the
extent of the assets they can hold is restricted. That is, the assets are limited to
purchases of short-term, highly marketable, and highly rated instruments that
are in the portfolios of money market mutual funds, such as short-term
Treasury securities, and highly rated commercial paper. Thus, the monetary
service companies correspond to narrow banks and provide payment services,
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4. In Herring and Litan (1995), however, Litan himself seems to cast doubt on the feasibility of narrow banking 
proposals.including check clearing, electronic funds, and discount windows. On the
other hand, the financial service companies can serve all other activities
including insurance and retailers.
5
(3) The proposal of Bryan (1991): Lastly, let us review the core bank proposal
set forth by Lowell Bryan of McKinsey & Co. (Bryan [1991]). This proposal,
like Litan’s, establishes the financial holding company, with the bank sub-
sidiary undertaking the narrow banking function. The extent of the safe assets
the bank subsidiary can hold is broad—some of the lending services such as 
mortgage loans can be provided by the bank subsidiary; hence, we conclude
that the bank subsidiary in this proposal is engaged in credit creation. The
lending subsidiary, on the other hand, provides such services as highly 
leveraged transactions and less-developed country lending.
To summarize, one proposal allows the narrow bank to invest only in short-term
safe assets such as TBs (e.g., the proposal of Pierce [1991]) while another proposal
allows the bank to extend credit to small firms (e.g., the proposal of Bryan [1991]).
In other words, there is no uniform definition of the narrow bank with regard to its
range of functions. This difference in narrow banking activities leads us to question
how robust each proposal would be against financial risk and what kind of proposal
is most feasible for achieving the stability of the financial system.
In order to classify the proposals, we set up two criteria. These are (1) whether safe
assets that the narrow bank is allowed to hold are limited to short-term assets, and 
(2) whether the narrow bank is allowed to participate in lending activity. In examining
the proposals, one must consider what remains outside the narrow banking activities.
We call a non-narrow bank a “finance company,” which provides services that are not
handled by the narrow bank. In advance of the detailed examination, we classify the
aforementioned narrow banking proposals in accordance with two criteria in Table 1.
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5. In addition, Pierce’s proposal holds that the monetary service companies have a capital base and enjoy federal
insurance for all their liabilities without limit.
Table 1  Classification of the Narrow Banking Proposals
Permitted to possess Permitted to possess long-term safe
short-term safe assets assets as well as short-term assets
Prohibited from conducting Pierce (1991) Litan (1987) lending activity
Permitted to conduct lending  n.a. Bryan (1991) activity
n.a.: Not available.
First, we study criterion (1), that is, the range of safe assets that the narrow bank is
allowed to hold. One proposal restricts the bank to investing in short-term safe assets,
while the others permit the bank to invest in long-term as well as short-term assets.
Holding long-term safe assets, the bank faces liquidity risk. Without suspension of
convertibility or issuance of subordinated debt, the bank may not be prevented from
bankruptcy due to liquidity shortage.
Second, we interpret criterion (2), that is, the synthesis of deposit and lending
activities within the same institution. One proposal removes lending activity from thenarrow bank, while the others allow the bank to create credit through restricted 
lending services. Suppose then that the narrow bank is prohibited from making any
loans; that is, the bank only conducts deposit-taking activity. In this case, however,
the bank may not present higher interest rates than in the case in which it conducts
two activities, because deposit-taking activity is generally thought to be less profitable
than lending activity. In addition, it may be difficult to distinguish between deposit
assets and other assets. Therefore, in the case in which the narrow bank is prohibited
strictly from lending money, any payment system outside the scope of the narrow
bank might be generated. In other words, the narrow bank might become a nuisance.
That is why some of the narrow banking proposals are thought to permit the narrow
bank to engage in lending activity, or the finance company to participate in the 
payment system along with the narrow bank. It, however, would be necessary to
restrict in some way the companies to which the narrow bank could lend money and
the payment methods used by the finance company. In these cases, it follows that the
efficiency of the proposals—that is, the degree to which credit risk is excluded from
the payment system—would be decreased. We now divide the proposals into classes
by means of these standards as follows. 
When we examine the proposals on the basis of Table 1, the “narrowest” bank
among them is the narrow bank in Pierce’s proposal. While the narrow bank of
Litan’s is subject to liquidity risk because it has safe but long-term assets, the narrow
bank of Bryan’s is permitted to engage in lending activity. Thus, this inspection leads
us to question how robust each proposal would be against financial risk and which
proposal is most feasible for achieving the stability of the financial system. In the 
following two chapters, we examine theoretically the proposals in accordance with
the classifications of Table 1.
III. Theoretical Analysis of Narrow Banks Using the Diamond
and Dybvig Model
In this chapter, we examine the narrow bank with reference to Wallace (1996), 
focusing on the first criterion in the previous chapter, namely, whether safe assets that
the narrow bank is allowed to possess are limited to short-term assets.
Wallace (1996) defines a narrow bank as a perfectly liquid bank with neither 
subordinated debt nor suspension of convertibility. Here, the “liquid bank” means
one that can accommodate any deposit withdrawal. In other words, only the bank
that satisfies any magnitude of deposit withdrawals can be called the narrow bank.
Under this definition, the economy consists of a narrow bank and an “illiquid bank.”
In addition, it assumes two cases of narrow banks: one that is allowed to invest only
in short-term safe assets, as in Pierce’s proposal, and one that is allowed to invest in
long-term safe assets as well as short-term assets, as in Litan’s proposal. With this
setup, we examine how much welfare can be achieved in the two cases.
In the model, Wallace extends that of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The
Diamond and Dybvig model, which consists of three dates (t = 0, 1, 2), has three
main features. First, there are a large number of identical consumers at date 0, and
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1 and 2 will be. The preferences are either an impatient type or a patient type. 
An impatient consumer is willing to sacrifice less of date 1 consumption, per unit of
additional date 2 consumption, than a patient consumer. Each consumer learns 
his or her type at the beginning of date 1, but needs to make a decision about his 
or her asset portfolio at date 0. Second, the bank has two linear constant-to-scale
technologies: short-term and long-term technologies. While a short-term technology
has a gross one-period return R1, a long-term technology has a gross two-period
return  R2. There is also a return for liquidation of investment in the long-term 
technology after one period; this gross return is r1. Then, it is assumed that R2 > 
(R1)
2 > (r1)
2. Third, the banking system deals with depositors on a first-come 
first-served basis. Based on these assumptions, the model examines bank runs caused
by a liquidity shortage. In addition, Wallace (1996) extends the third assumption of
the Diamond and Dybvig model and assumes that, at date 1, the illiquid bank 
can suspend deposit withdrawals if they surmount the volume of the optimal 
consumption at date 1. This extension excludes the bank run of the illiquid bank
from the model and focuses only on the bank run of the narrow bank.
We point out in advance some limitations of the models of Diamond and Dybvig
and Wallace, before examining the narrow bank in detail. First, the models cannot
examine bank runs that originated from bad loans, because they do not assume default
risk on loans. Second, the analysis of payment services is outside their scope. Although
deposits are widely used as a payment method in practice, financing among banks is
not analyzed in the original Diamond and Dybvig model. Recent contributions such
as that of Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (1998), however, deal with financing among the
banks, extending Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and examine contagion effects in the
payment system, undertaking a comparative analysis of the real-time gross settlement
system and designated-time net settlement system. Such extensions of the Diamond
and Dybvig model into the analysis of payment services are noteworthy as significant
examples of academic progress in modeling the payment system explicitly. 
Based on these assumptions, we examine the implications of Wallace (1996) 
concerning the narrow bank. First, suppose that the narrow bank is prohibited from
engaging in lending activity and allowed to invest only in short-term safe assets, as in
Pierce’s proposal, while the illiquid bank is allowed to invest in entrepreneurial firms,
and short-term and long-term safe assets, and takes not only demand deposits but
also time deposits.
This model concludes that, at date 0, consumers invest funds for the smallest
amount of consumption that will be needed at date 1 under uncertainty in the 
narrow bank and the remaining funds go to the illiquid bank. Consequently, all 
consumption at date 1 can be covered only by short-term safe assets and the con-
sumption at date 2 can be covered only by long-term safe assets. This case can avoid
inefficient resource allocation, in contrast to the case of autarky, where no banks exist
because uncertainty as to future consumption for all the consumers disappears.
Second, suppose that the narrow bank is permitted to invest in long-term 
safe assets as well as short-term ones, as in Litan’s proposal. The narrow bank, by 
definition, guarantees any deposit withdrawals and, on the other hand, can hold safe
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consumption that will be needed at date 1 under uncertainty in short-term safe
assets, whichever bank consumers make a deposit in, and the remaining funds in
long-term assets. This consumer behavior is due to uncertainty of future consump-
tion, and it is shown that this behavior accomplishes welfare loss compared to the
above-mentioned case of Pierce.
Thus, Wallace shows that whether a narrow banking proposal can achieve the
Pareto optimum depends on its definitions of the narrow bank and, in addition, 
that Pierce’s proposal is more efficient than Litan’s.
IV. Theoretical Analysis of Narrow Banking Proposals Using
KRS (1998)
This section studies the second standard in the classification of the narrow banking
proposals, i.e., whether the narrow bank can be involved in lending activity, along
with deposit-taking activity. We are especially interested in the recent contribution by
KRS (1998), who suggest that there exists a synergy effect between the liquidity
needs in the two activities.
A. Rationale of Integrated Operation of Deposit-Taking and Lending Services
Organizational structures of financial institutions vary widely—some institutions
such as investment banks only provide lending services while not engaging in
deposit-taking activity; others such as regional banks provide both deposit-taking and
lending services. These structural differences in banking organization raise a question
of whether there is a rationale for providing the two services in a single institution—
in other words, how can the narrow banking proposals such as those of Litan (1987)
and Pierce (1991) be justified if there is a rationale for integrating the two services?
The academic contribution thus far has not dealt with such questions. For 
example, Diamond (1984) regards a bank as an entity that distinguishes good 
potential borrowers from bad ones. This is often called ex ante monitoring of 
financial intermediation. Similarly, Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) stress the role 
of the main bank in the Japanese financial system as an ex post monitor of the 
borrowers. These monitoring activities are often referred to as a bank’s delegated
monitoring, which must be integrated in the financial institution, due to the fact that
monitoring is costly. In other words, investors always have an incentive to free-ride
on others’ monitoring activity, and in the worst case, nobody would serve as the
monitor. In order to prevent such a situation, banks play a role as a delegated 
monitor. The above-mentioned papers, nevertheless, take the liability side of a bank’s
balance sheet as given, namely, that it does not matter whether a bank raises funds 
by means of deposits or mutual funds.
Another strand of research, such as that by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
examines deposit-taking activity, stressing the role of banks as an insurer against 
liquidity shock. It nonetheless does not analyze the asset side of a bank’s
balance sheet.
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sides of the balance sheet. The core question to ask is whether there is a rationale for
undertaking both deposit-taking and lending activities within the same financial
institution. The essence of the discussion, given by Rajan (1996), can be summarized
as follows.
Rajan (1996) argues that the most fundamental function of the financial 
institution is not only to provide liquidity to borrowers but also to provide the 
“commitment line,” whereby the borrowers have access to liquidity within the limit
set in advance by the financial institution. In return, the financial institution receives
a fee. The commitment line appears on the balance sheet only after the line is 
provided.
6 It would now be helpful to see some evidence from the United States. 
In this regard, Table 2 shows that 74.1 percent of the outstanding commercial 
and industrial loans (US$122 billion) made during the first week of November 1998
were carried out based on the commitment line contract.
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6. Strictly speaking, the liquidity shock generated by the commitment line appears on the liability side—namely, the
bank, making loans under the commitment line, transfers the equivalent amount of money in the borrower’s
account through which borrowers establish access to the liquidity. The consequence henceforth does not differ
from the liquidity shock generated by the withdrawal of deposits. We are, however, more interested in the source
of the shock, which we can identify between the commitment line and the deposit withdrawal.
Table 2  Commercial and Industrial Loans Made by All Commercial Banks
(November 2–6, 1998)
US$ millions, percent
Amount of loans Made under commitment
All loans 122,252 74.1
0 to daily 049,558 62.6
2 to 30 days 030,458 89.9
31 to 365 days 018,059 87.9
Over 365 days 003,076 59.0
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, “Survey of Terms of Business Lending.”
In Japan, however, because of the legal uncertainty with regard to the inter-
pretation of the Interest Rate Restriction Law, the commitment line service has not
been widely used. For historical reasons, Japanese banks have provided an overdraft
service to their clients. This service plays a role similar to that of the commitment
line, in the sense that the banks are exposed to the liquidity shock arising from the
asset side of their balance sheets. On the aggregate level, overdrafts account for nearly
20 percent of banks’ lending activities; in particular, large firms have used the 
overdraft facility to cope with short-term urgent liquidity needs. This implies 
that the Japanese banks have also been exposed to the liquidity shock arising from 
the asset side.
This close relationship between banks and firms cannot be achieved in financial
markets where the relationship tends to be at arm’s length. Rajan (1996) stresses that
the market-based relationship cannot satisfy unpredictable liquidity needs, and it is
exactly with regard to this function that financial institutions enjoy a comparative
advantage over the arm’s length relationship in the markets.B. Synergy Effect between Deposit-Taking and Lending
The liquidity needs as pointed out above are expected to have synergy with the 
liquidity shock arising from the liability side, i.e., the deposit withdrawals. In the
demand deposit contract, depositors are given the option to withdraw their deposits
at their discretion. In the next section, we examine whether there is a synergy effect
between deposit-taking and lending services, based on KRS (1998), and derive a 
policy implication for the narrow banking proposals.
To summarize, we first suppose a situation wherein banks are exposed to liquidity
shock arising from both the asset and liability sides. Naturally, banks hold liquid
assets in order to satisfy the liquidity needs of the customers while at the same time
they would like to reduce the amount of liquid assets as much as possible. This is 
due to the fact that (1) banks incur an opportunity cost in holding the liquid assets,
and (2) by holding more liquid assets, managers generate an incentive to engage in
opportunistic behavior and the agency cost may prevail. In this situation, as long as
the liquidity needs on both the asset and liability sides are not perfectly correlated—
in other words, the need for liquidity does not arise simultaneously—banks can use
the liquid assets more efficiently; hence, there is a rationale for them to provide two
services together.
This leads to a conclusion that the narrow banking proposals such as those of
Pierce (1991) and Litan (1987), which separate the two services, generate inefficiency
because the separation deprives the banks of the synergy effect of the liquidity. 
On the other hand, the proposal of Bryan (1991), in which the deposit-taking and
lending activities are integrated, seems to be more efficient.
1. Overview
This section outlines the synergy effect of the deposit-taking and lending activities. 
It is worth mentioning that some argue that the primary reason behind the com-
bination of the two activities is the existence of financial regulation, rather than the
synergy effect. Banks have a natural tendency to prefer funds covered by deposit
insurance, causing moral hazard to prevail. In order to prevent the banks’ moral 
hazard problem, it is better to separate deposit-taking and lending activities in 
different institutions; thus, narrow banking proposals such as those of Pierce (1991)
and Litan (1987) are supported.
Another view that stresses the existence of the synergy effect finds the Pierce-Litan
type of narrow banking proposal to be a source of inefficiency. It stresses that the 
core activity on the banks’ asset side is to provide commitment line service to 
their customers. The commitment line has a feature similar to that of the demand
deposit, since the customers have free access to the liquidity by the amount 
specified in advance.
Consider the following two situations: first, a liquid asset is owned by a single
bank that takes care of the liquidity needs on both asset and liability sides, and 
second, the liquid asset is owned by two banks, one of which deals with the liquidity
need on the asset side while the other deals with the liquidity need on the liability
side. In this case, the welfare level of the former appears to be higher than that of the
latter. This suggests that the narrow banking proposal of Bryan (1991), who claims
that the two activities should be provided at the same institution, is supported.
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This section examines KRS (1998). We start by describing the basic setup of the
model. The model consists of three periods (periods 0, 1, and 2) and there are a bank,
a firm, and depositors. In period 0, a bank diversifies L to a loan and S0 to a liquid
asset. The maturity arrives in period 2, which generates the net return equivalent
with rL. The liquid asset can be liquidated either in period 1 or period 2, but it costs
S0, which represents either an opportunity cost or an agency cost. Moreover, the bank
provides the commitment line amounting to C and in return it receives fCas a com-
mitment fee. The loans based on the commitment contract are assumed to be short
term. In addition, the bank issues equity in periods 0 and 1. The equity issued in
period 0, e0, pays a dividend equal to (2µ + µ
2)e0 and the equity issued in period 1, e1,
pays a dividend equal to µe1+ α e1
2/2. The balance sheet under this setup can be
shown below.
Bank
Reserve RS Demand deposit D
D
Short-term safe asset S Time deposit D
T
Loan L Equity e
Commitment line C
The reserve RS is assumed to be constant, and for the sake of simplicity we
assume it to be zero. On the balance sheet, the execution of the commitment line is
counted by an increase in loans and an increase in demand deposit. The bank will
satisfy the liquidity need by letting its customer withdraw from his or her demand
deposit. In practice, loans made under commitment contract and others cannot be
distinguished. Nonetheless, we indicate it by C in order to separate from the ordinary
loans, L. The maximization problem of the bank is written as follows.
max E0{rL + fC+ µzC + µS1 – τ S0 – (2µ + µ
2)e0 – µe1 – α /2e 1
2}, (1)
L,C,S0
s.t. L + S0 = D0 + e0, (2)
L + S1 + zC = D0(1 – ω ) + e0 + e1, (3)
S1 ≥ 0, (4)
where µ is the market rate and z is the state variable indicating whether there is a 
use of the commitment line. Similarly, ω represents the state variable to show a 
withdrawal of the demand deposit, and α represents the coefficient of the risk 
premium generated by the information asymmetry. In the maximization problem,
conditions (2) and (3) are the liquidity constraints in periods 0 and 1. Condition (2)
means that the bank lending and the liquid asset must come from either the demand
deposit or equity. Condition (3) means that the bank lending in period 1, the liquid
asset, and the use of the commitment line must be financed by the demand deposit
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short sale of the liquid asset.
Solving this problem, we derive the following equation.
α (1 – ρ )     df α (1 – ρ )(2ρ – ρ
2 – 1)      τ + µ + µ
2
f = [——— — – — —]C*+ ———————— —D0+ ————. (5)
4 – 2ρ dC 4 – 2ρ 2 – ρ
Suppose now that the probability of the use of the commitment line conditional
on the deposit withdrawal is denoted by ρ . As long as ρ <1, meaning that the use of
the commitment line and the deposit withdrawal are not perfectly correlated, we
derive (2ρ – ρ
2 – 1) < 0, and the coefficient of D0 is negative. Also, df /dC < 0 leads
us to conclude that the coefficient of C* is positive. In order for equation (5) to be
always equal to f, an increase in C* has to be offset by an increase in D0. In other
words, as a result of the bank’s optimizing behavior, the more demand deposits the
bank collects, the more liquid assets the bank must hold in order to prepare for 
the withdrawals that occur with probability ω . In order to promote an efficient use 
of the liquid assets, the bank raises an upper bound of the commitment line.
To summarize the conclusion in this section, the bank’s assets can be used to 
satisfy the liquidity need generated from both the asset and liability sides. In this 
situation, if the liquidity needs on both sides are not perfectly correlated, the use of
the commitment line and the deposit withdrawal cannot take place simultaneously.
Therefore, as long as banks hold liquid assets, there is a rationale for providing the
two services together.
From this point of view, the complete separation of the lending and deposit-
taking activities damages the synergy effect of the liquidity needs on both the asset
and liability sides; hence, the narrow banking proposals that support the separation
cannot be accepted.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper examined theoretically the economic implications of narrow banks. First,
we classified narrow banks presented in the practical narrow banking proposals by
means of two standards: (1) whether safe assets that the narrow bank is permitted to
hold are limited to short-term assets; and (2) whether the narrow bank is permitted
to engage in lending activity. Second, we examine theoretically the feasibility of 
each proposal for achieving the stability of the financial system, making use of 
two theoretical models: Wallace (1996) and KRS (1998), on the basis of the 
classifications of Table 1. 
Wallace (1996) shows that, if safe assets in which the narrow bank is permitted to
invest are limited to short-term assets, the financial system may achieve the Pareto
optimum. On the other hand, if the narrow bank is permitted to possess long-term
safe assets as well as short-term ones, the system cannot achieve the Pareto 
optimum. Thus, the proposal of Pierce (1991) is more efficient than that of Litan
116 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 2000(1987). On the other hand, KRS (1998) focus on whether deposit-taking and loan
commitment (part of bank lending activity) can share some of the costly overhead—
that is, the large volume of liquid assets such as cash and securities—and examine
theoretically as well as empirically whether two separate institutions specialize in
either deposit-taking or loan commitment activity. It is empirically shown that one
institution carries out both deposit-taking and loan commitment activities. Summing
up the two conclusions derived from the models, we show that a desirable narrow
bank is one that carries out both deposit-taking and lending activities, though restric-
tively, and is permitted to invest in short-term safe assets. Comparing this result with
Table 1, the desirable proposal corresponds to the lower left-hand quadrant.
7
In the end, however, we point out two limitations of the theoretical analysis of
this paper. First, we focus only on liquidity risk, which is among many risks managed
by banks. Bank runs in our model would be due to unexpected deposit withdrawals,
not caused by fear of unsoundness of bank loans. Second, the model does not 
sufficiently examine payment activity, wherein consumers make deposits only in
order to achieve their optimal consumption under future uncertainty, not to settle
their accounts. Thus, we cannot necessarily examine whether Japan’s postal savings
system would exist as a narrow bank, or whether central banks and narrow banks
would be competitive.
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